Constitutional Law - Due Process - Right to Counsel by Lebrun, Gene
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 39 Number 2 Article 9 
1963 
Constitutional Law - Due Process - Right to Counsel 
Gene Lebrun 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lebrun, Gene (1963) "Constitutional Law - Due Process - Right to Counsel," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 
39 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol39/iss2/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
driver who does so transforms his automobile into a danger-
ous undirected mechanism. Realistically no circumstances
or excuses should justify such conduct when one considers
the duty of care imposed upon every driver. When one is
under a duty to use care not to injure another, he cannot
fulfill that duty by falling asleep. The above stated rule acts
as a much greater deterent force and allows the aggrieved
parties a sounder remedy.' 3 Therefore such conduct should
not be excusable.
Although there is no North Dakota case law exactly
in point, it is submitted that the courts of this state should
follow the view expressed in the instant case.
WILLIAM JAY JOHNSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT To COUNSEL
-Petitioner was charged in a Flordia state court with
having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit
a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law.
The court denied petitioner's request for a court-appointed
counsel. Being without funds he was forced to conduct his
own defense. He was found guilty and sentenced to five
years in the state prison. On the grounds that the court's
refusal to appoint him counsel denied him constitutional
rights, the petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Florida Supreme Court. All relief was denied. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded to the Supreme Court
of Florida. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
At common law a person charged with treason or a
felony had no right to counsel; in fact, counsel was not
allowed for such crimes. Strange as it may seem, counsel
was allowed, indeed, even required in most misdemeanor
cases.' In this country twelve of the original thirteen colon-
ies guaranteed the right to counsel either in their constitu-
13. Once the plaintiff has proven that the driver fell asleep, the driver
cannot excuse or justify his conduct.
1. I STEPHAN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
341 (1883): I ARCHBOLD'S CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PLEADING 54(8th ed. 1880).
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tions or by statute.2  With the exception of two of these
colonies, the right to counsel meant only the right of the
accused to retain a counsel of his own choice in cases of
capital offenses; not the right to have counsel appointed by
the court.3
Upon the ratification of the Federal Bill of Rights in 1791,
the right to counsel in "all criminal prosecutions" became
a part of our Federal Constitution.4  The first important
judicial interpretation of this clause of the Sixth Amendment
was made in 1938. 5 Justice Black in Johnson v. Zerbst
designated the right to counsel as "one of the safeguards
of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure funda-
mental human rights of life and liberty." 6 Yet, due to earlier
decisions,7 these "fundamental human rights" were to apply
only to the federal courts, and not to the state courts.
Nevertheless, six years prior to the Zerbst decision, the
United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama, stated
that the right to counsel is of "fundamental character" and
as such " . . . is embraced within the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9  Thus, it was unnecessary
to rely upon either state law or the Sixth Amendment to
guarantee the right to counsel in a state capital case. The
Court, ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,-t specifically stated
that "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found
in the Sixth Amendment. . . ." It was held that only when
the special circumstances" of the particular cases operated
2. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 64 (1932).
3. BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS. 21(1955).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel fer his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI
(emphasis added).
5. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
6. Id., 462.
7. Bairon v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Hurtado v. California. 110
U.S., 516 (1884).
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where previously a state court refused to appoint
effective counsel in a capital case.
9. Id., 67.
10. 316 U.S. 455, 461, 462 (1942).
11. In Cash v. Culver. 258 U.S. 633, 637 (1959), quoting in part Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) the Court stated: "'Where the gravity
of the crime and other factors-such as the age and education of the de-
fendant, the conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, and the
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to deprive an accused of due process of law guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment that the accused had his con-
stitutional rights infringed. 12  This "special circumstance"
test has since been applied in varying degrees by the courts.1 3
Justice Black dissented vigorously in the Betts case, 14
maintaining that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth
applicable to the states, and has since held firm to this
contention.1" His majority opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright"
expressly overrules the Betts decision. The Court in that
case " . . . made an abrupt break with its own well-consid-
ered precedents."', Although Justice Black does not express-
ly say that this case incorporates the Sixth Amendment, he
implies this by comparing the right to counsel with other
fundamental principles of liberty expressly contained in the
Bill of Rights which are equally protected against state in-
vasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'
What is to be the effect of Gideon v. Wainwright? Will
it " . . . furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for
opening wide the prison doors of the land"?' 9 Will it re-
quire state courts to provide an accused with counsel in all
criminal prosecutions? Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion proposes that the special circumstances rule should
be " . . . abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to of-
fenses . . . of a substantial prison sentence. ' 20  It seems
complicated nature of the offenses charged and the possible defenses
thereto-render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in
injustice as to be fundamentally unfair'; the Constitution requires that the
accused must have legal assistance at his trial."
12. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
13. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina.
363 U.S. 697 (1960); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v.
La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1957); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942).
15. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 518 (1962) (dissenting opinion):
Bute v*. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1947) (dissenting opinion); Foster v.
Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 140 (1946) (dissenting opinion.).
16. 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
17. Id., 796, Justice Black felt that the Powell v. Alabama case "...un-
equivocally declared that 'the right to the aid of counsel is of . . . funda-
mental character' ".
18. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (speech and press);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion); De Jonge v. Ore-
gon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP.
366 U.S. 293 (1961) (association); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963) (speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances); Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (eminent domain); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (search and seizure); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660(1962) (cruel and unusual punishment).
19. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1946).
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 801 (1963) (concurring opinion).
He also stated, "Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need
not now be decided."
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to have been the intention of the Court in this case to re-
move any discrepancies between state and federal court pro-
cedural rights to counsel, as was done regarding illegal search
and seizure in Mapp v. Ohio. 21 What the minimum charges
shall be to warrant this "right to counsel" must await future
litigation.
22
GENE LEBRUN
CRIMINAL LAW-ALIBI-AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN IOWA-
The defendant was indicted for second degree murder.
Under Iowa's disclosure Statute1 defendant gave notice of
his intention to, plead alibi. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme
Court held, three judges dissenting, that the trial court prop-
erly instructed the jury that the defendant was under a burden
to establish his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence;
yet, if the evidence as a whole left a reasonable doubt of
guilt, the jury must acquit. The dissent argued that this
instruction was contradictory, and that it denied the defend-
ant his presumption of innocence by making him prove his
non-presence. State v. Stump, 119 N. W. 2d 210 (Iowa 1963).
Iowa's stringent alibi rules have been severly criticized, 2
even though the state claims all the common safeguards of
"reasonable doubt" in its criminal prosecutions. 3 If the
accused pleads not guilty, he denies that he participated in
the commission of the crime, and he need only raise a reason-
able doubt of this fact.4  But if he goes further and says
that he was so far away that he could not possibly have
committed the crime, he must prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence,5 in order to be acquitted on that ground
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. In another recent decision, Douglas v. People of State of California.
83 Sup. Ct. 814 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that an in-
digent defenant charged and convicted of a felony had a right to a court-
appointed counsel for an appeal.
1. Iowa Code Ann., tit. 36, § 777.18 (1962). "Where the defendant
pleads not guilty and proposes to show insanity as a defense, or that he
relies on an alibi or that he was at some other place at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense charged, he shall, at the time he pleads
or at any time thereafter, not later than four days before the trial, file a
written notice of this purpose. See State v. Rourick, 245 Iowa 319.
60 N.W.2d 529 (1953).
2. See State v. Reed, 62 Iowa 40, 17 N.W. 150 (1883); State v. Hamil-
ton, 57 Iowa 596. 11 N.W. 5 (1881). See also 27 Mich. L. Rev. 702 (1929).
3. State v. Red, 207 Iowa 69, 151 N.W. 831, 832 (1880).
4. State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 151 N.W. 581, 586 (1915).
5. ]bl!d.
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